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NOTES 255
founding it seems peculiarly appropriate to print this excerpt from
his writings, which appeared originally in the Moot Court Record
of the School of Law and which has not heretofore been published
in any medium of general circulation. The Moot Court Record
has been published continuously for the law students at Washington
University for the past forty years. At present it contains only the
proceedings of the practice court of the School of Law.
PROTECTION THROUGH RECORDING OF CONDITION-
AL SALES OF FIXTURES
This note involves a consideration of the problems which have arisen
in settling the conflicting rights of conditional sellers of fixtures and of
subsequent purchasers of the realty. Take a typical case: A purchases
from B on a conditional sales contract a machine, installing it in his
factory, the circumstances being such that it becomes a fixture. B
records his contract.1 Before B is paid in full, however, A sells his fac-
tory to C, who now resists B's claim against him for a return of the
machine. Can C successfully resist this claim? In other words, by
filing the conditional sale contract, did the conditional seller B thereby
give constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers
of the realty?
An answer to this problem would be simple but for the fact that in
practically all states, including Missouri,2 there are two separate sets of
records for the recording of instruments, one for those relating to
realty and one for those relating to personalty, the latter including con-
ditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages. The solution depends
upon whether or not the filing of a conditional sale agreement in its own
proper book gives constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the
realty who looks only to the real estate records.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of realty goes to the office of the
recorder of deeds to look up the title. He searches through the real es-
tate records, finds the title clear, and purchases. Had he searched the
personal property records, he would have found a conditional sale con-
tract covering fixtures ordinarily part of the realty. Is he to be de-
prived of these fixtures? On the other hand, has not the conditional
vendor of the fixtures done all that he reasonably could do to protect
himself ?
'Statutes generally provide that conditional sales shall be void as to creditors
and subsequent purchasers in good faith unless recorded. See R. S. Mo. 1919,
Sec. 2284.
'R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 10570: "Instruments in writing, conveying chattels or
personal property alone, which by any law of this state are required to be re-
corded or admitted of record in any recorder's office in this state, shall be re-
corded in a series of volumes separate from those used for recording convey-
ances of real estate."
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Such is the problem the courts have faced, and there has been a dif-
ference of opinion as to who should be protected. In the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act we find a solution to the difficulty, because it pro-
vides for the filing of conditional sales on the realty records. A brief
discussion of the two lines of holdings, and of the Uniform Act in its
provision for fixtures, follows.
Cases from Ohio, 3 New Hampshire,4 California,5 and Texas,G hold
that the purchaser of land is not bound to examine the chattel mortgage
and conditional sale contract records to ascertain whether there is any
conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage on chattels which have
been affixed to the realty. The reasoning behind this line of authority
is clearly set forth in Brennan v. Whitaker,7 and in Elliott v. Hiudson.8
The latter case points out that the California statute requires mortgages
of personal property to be separately recorded in a different book from
the records of deeds, and concludes that as each record is constructive
notice of transactions authorized to be made matter of record therein
but no further, the purchaser of land need not look to the record of
chattel mortgages and is not bound by what is recorded therein.
The opposite view, to the effect that the filing of the conditional sale
contract is sufficient to charge intending purchasers of the realty, is
held by cases from Illinois,9 Kansas,10 New Jersey,21 Virginia,'1 Mich-
igan,"3 New York,1 4 and Georgia.15 This is the majority view. As
pointed out in Sword v. Low,' the examination of title to realty should
'Brennan v. Whitaker (1864) 15 Ohio St. 446; Case Mfg. Co. v. Garven
(1887) 45 Ohio St. 289, 13 N. E. 493.
'Tibbetts v. Home (1889) 65 N. H. 242, 23 A. 145, 15 L. R. A. 56, 23 Am.
St. Rep. 31.
'Elliott v. Hudson (1912) 18 Cal. App. 642, 124 Pac. 103, 108.6 Ice, Light and Water Co. v. Lone Star Engine and Boiler Works (1897) 15
Tex. Civ. App. 694, 41 S. W. 835; Phillips v. Newsome (1915) 179 S. W. 1123
(Tex. Civ. App.).
'Supra, Note 3. A widely quoted paragraph from this case declares:
"The filing of chattel mortgages is made constructive notice only of encum-
brances upon goods and chattels. The defendants purchased and took a con-
veyance of real estate of which the property now in question was, in law, a part;
and in our opinion, it devolved upon the plaintiffs, who sought to change the
legal character of the property, and create encumbrances upon it, either to pursue
the mode prescribed by law for encumbering the kind of estate to which it ap-
peared to the world to belong, and for giving notice of such encumbrance, or,
otherwise, take the risk of its loss in case it should be sold and conveyed as part
of the real estate to a purchaser without notice."
'Supra, note 5.
'Sword v. Low (1887) 122 Ill. 487, 13 N. E. 826.
Eaves v. Estes (1872) 10 Kan. 314, 15 Am. Rep. 345.
'Keeler v. Keeler (1879) 31 N. J. Eq. 181.
" Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook (1909) 109 Va. 382, 63 S. E. 1070.
"Burrill v. Wilcox Lumber Co. (1887) 65 Mich. 571, 32 N. W. 824.
" Ford v. Cobb (1859) 20 N. Y. 344; Kribbs v. Alford (1890) 120 N. Y. 519,
24 N. E. 811; Rowland v. West (1892) 62 Hun. 583, 17 N. Y. S. 330; Jermyn v.
Hunter (1904) 93 App. Div. 175, 87 N. Y. S. 546.
"Int'l. Clay Mach'y Co. v. Moultrie Baking Co. (1925) 34 Ga. App. 396, 129
S. E. 877.
" Supra, note 9.
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necessarily involve the examination of the conditional sale and chattel
mortgage record to determine whether articles apparently attached to
the soil as permanent fixtures are subject to liens as personalty, and
that there is no hardship in thus requiring the purchaser of realty to
take notice of what is upon the public record.
The ultimate effect of this majority view is that a prospective pur-
chaser of the real estate, to escape being deprived of fixtures ordinarily
a part of the land, must search the personal property records for con-
tracts of conditional sales and chattel mortgages. Why not go a step
further, and provide for the filing of these instruments in the real estate
records, where in such cases as these they naturally belong? This is
precisely what Section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act pro-
vides,17 as far as conditional sales contracts are concerned.'" This sec-
tion is modeled in the main after similar laws previously existing in
Massachusetts, 19 New York,20 Oregon,21 and Pennsylvania,22 to the ef-
fect that the condition reserving title to fixtures shall be void as against
subsequent purchasers or mortgagees of the realty who have no notice
of the conditional sale, unless the conditional sale contract or a copy
thereof is recorded in the office and upon the records where a deed of
land would have to be recorded to affect such realty.
" Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Section 7, Fixtures: "If the goods are so
affixed to realty at the time of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become a
part thereof and not to be severable wholly or in any portion without material
injury to the freehold, the reservation of property as to any portion not so sev-
erable shall be void after the goods are so affixed as against any person who
has not expressly assented to the reservation. If the goods are so affixed to
realty at the time of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become part thereof
but to be severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of
property shall be void after the goods are so affixed as against subsequent pur-
chasers of the realty for value and without notice of the conditional seller's title,
unless the conditional sale contract, or a copy thereof, together with a statement
signed by the seller briefly describing the realty and stating that the goods are
or are to be affixed thereto, shall be filed before such purchase in the office
where a deed of the realty would be recorded or registered to affect such realty.
As against the owner of realty the reservation of property in goods by a con-
ditional seller shall be void when such goods are to be so affixed to the realty
as to become part thereof but to be severable without material injury to the
freehold, unless the conditional sale contract, or a copy thereof, together with
a statement signed by the seller briefly describing the realty and stating that the
goods are to be affixed thereto, shall be filed before they are affixed, in the of-
fice where a deed would be recorded or registered to affect such realty."
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act has been adopted as a whole in Arizona,
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Alaska.
' Chattel mortgages of fixtures, however, are still filed as personal property
records. No doubt a provision covering them is necessary to complete the ad-
justment of the rights of chattel vendors, who retain title or lien; and subse-
quent buyers of the realty. In New York City there is a special provision re-
quiring such chattel mortgages to be filed as real property records, if they are
to be constructive notice. N. Y. Laws, 1909, c. 45, Personal Property Law,
Sec. 63.
See Mass. Laws, 1921, c. 42, s. 67.
" See New York Laws, 1923, c. 42, s. 67.
See Oleson's Oregon Laws, 1920, s. 10189.
" See Pa. Statutes, 1920, s. 19731.
Washington University Open Scholarship
258 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
The value of this provision of the Uniform Act, offering a way of
protecting the rights of both the vendors of fixtures and subsequent
purchasers or encumbrancers of the realty, is self evident. Professor
Bogert, who drafted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, comments on
the purpose of this new provision: "The theory of the Act is that a con-
ditional seller of a fixture should be given protection and allowed to re-
tain title as security for the payment of the price of the fixture, but that
in order to retain such title he should be required to give notice adapted
as nearly as possible to reaching dealers in real property. The condi-
tional seller of the fixture should not get protection by filing the contract
with ordinary conditional sale contracts and making a record similar to
that made in the case of chattel mortgages. It is unreasonable to ask
purchasers and mortgagees of realty to search the personal property
records regarding every article connected with a building which might
have been sold separately. '23
An analysis of Section 7 of the Uniform Act 24 shows that it consists
of three sentences, each covering a particular situation in the law of
fixtures. What these situations are, and what the conditional vendor
must do in each situation, will now be briefly pointed out:
(1) If the goods are so affixed to the realty as not to be sever-
able without material injury to the freehold only express assent by
the subsequent vendee will reserve, title. Hence in this class of
cases, filing the conditional sale contract alone does not protect the
seller. This provision seems just, since it is intended to apply in
cases where the chattels lose their identity with the realty.
(2) If the goods are affixed to the realty but readily severable
without material injury, the conditional seller protects himself by
putting a record upon the-real estate records. It might be noticed
that this record consists of the contract or a copy thereof, and also
a statement signed by the seller briefly describing the realty and
stating that the goods are or are to be affixed thereto.
(3) The last sentence of Section 7 covers the peculiar case of
the sale of goods to a contractor to be affixed by him to the real
property of another, and provides for filing a record as in the sec-
ond class above.
New York has adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,25 and
there are three recent cases from its appellate courts decided under or
considering the section on fixtures.
Metropolitan Stone Works, Inc. v. Probel Holding Corporation,20 is
decided on the basis of the Act. Here the contract of conditional sale
' Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales (1924) 98. Taken from Cornell
Law Quarterly, April, 1928, p. 437.
'Supra, note 17.
Supra note 17. Section 7 of the Uniform Act is found in New York Pers.
Prop. Law, s. 67, added by Laws 1922, c. 642, s. 2.28227 N. Y. S. 414 (Feb., 1928).
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for a concrete fountain and concrete flower boxes, actually attached by
cement to the realty, was duly recorded. There was every indication
that the intention of the party making the annexation was to make it a
permanent accession to the freehold. The defendant purchased the
realty at foreclosure sale.
The court in part of its opinion declares: "Here clearly the chattels
have become part of the realty. The only question is: Are these chat-
tels severable or not without material injury to the freehold?
that is the only question involved, because the first sentence of Sec. 67,
present Personal Property Law, seems to make that the sole test, thus
changing the ruling of the Court of Appeals,2 7 where the intent of the
parties was the paramount test, as to whether chattels, so affixed to the
realty, shall remain personalty or not." The court found that the chat-
tels here could be removed without material injury,28 and held for the
conditional seller. He had filed his contract, and since the chattels
were severable easily, express assent by the defendant was not neces-
sary.
Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp.,29 brings out another result of the
Uniform Act. There the plaintiff claimed under a recorded realty
mortgage made after the conditional sale of 39 gas ranges installed in
an apartment house. The conditional seller had failed to file his con-
tract as the Act provides he may. It was held that the unrecorded
reservation of title was void against the subsequent real estate mort-
gagee, and that the gas stoves passed as part of the realty. 0 The
earlier New York cases held that gas ranges in an apartment house,
connected by the usual service pipes, were personal property.31 But
"Davis v. Bliss (1907) 187 N. Y. 77, 1. c. 82, 79 N. E. 851, 10 L. R. A- (N. S.)
458; McCloskey v. Henderson (1921) 231 N. Y. 130, 1. c. 134, 131 N. E. 865.
' On this point, the court said: "The evidence shows there is a very simple
way of removing the fountain and flower boxes, by loosening and breaking the
cement binding and unscrewing the iron pipes in the fountain and disconnecting
the electric wires. Thus the freehold will remain uninjured, and other boxes
and another fountain may replace the ones removed."
" 226 N. Y. S. 209 (Jan., 1928).
*'There has been some dispute as to whether removable ranges in an apart-
ment house should pass as part of the realty. However, the better view today
seems to be that they should, since they are a part of the necessary and perma-
nent equipment of a tenement house. Mechanics & Traders Bank v. Bergen
Heights Realty Corp., 137 App. Div. 45, 122 N. Y. S. 33. Also see Hanson v.
Vose, 144 Minn. 264, 175 N. W. 113. Cornell Law Quarterly, 13:438, truly de-
clares: "The jurisdictions which held that gas ranges were not fixtures seemed
to be carrying one step further an already mistaken analogy. From lamps and
candlesticks used for lighting, it was reasoned that gas chandeliers for the same
purpose, and easily removable, remained personalty. And from that, that gas
ranges connected in the same way, which could be detached and used elsewhere,
belonged in the same class."
'Cosgrove v. Troescher (1901) 62 App. Div. 123,' 104 N. Y. S. 764; Central
Union Gas Co v. Browning (1913) 210 N. Y. 10, 103 N. E. 822, reversing same
case in 131 N. Y. S. 464. In regard to the latter case, the Metropolitan Stone
Works case declares that section 7 of the Uniform Act was intended to remedy
the condition disclosed therein. Hence the court's holding in the Cohen case,
decided under the Uniform Act, looks proper.
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Proskauer, J., in the present case, declined to follow those cases, on the
ground that the Uniform Act had changed the New York law of fix-
tures.
Kohler Co. v. Brasum,82 gives some attention to the section on fix-
tures under their present laws,"3 though not resting the decision upon
this provision. Nothing unexpressed in the two above cases is men-
tioned. 34
These three cases, which are probably examples of what may be ex-
pected in the future, clearly reveal the beneficial effect of the adoption
of Section 7 of the Uniform Act in outlining an adequate and practical
method of adjusting the conflicting rights of conditional sellers of chat-
tels to become annexed to the realty and subsequent purchasers of the
realty. This provision is without a doubt one of the finest recent devel-
opments in the law of sales, and its adoption should be heartily endorsed
everywhere.
D. A. MACPHERSON, JR., '29.
226 N. Y. S. (60) (Dec., 1927).
'Supra, note 25.
"For a full discussion of the Kohler case and the Cohen case, see CornellLaw Quarterly, 13:435-8.
REMOVABILITY WHERE RESIDENT CO-DEFENDANT IS
NOT SERVED
In Rodgers v. Gaines Bros. Co.' a resident of Missouri brought an
action for personal injuries in the state court, alleged to have been
caused by the joint negligence of the defendant corporation, organized
in Oklahoma, and the defendant foreman, a citizen of Missouri. The
corporation was alleged to have furnished an unsafe wagon and the
foreman was alleged to have directed the plaintiff to drive it in a dan-
gerous place. The resident foreman was not served with summons.
The defendant corporation filed a petition for removal to the federal
court, on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The petition was de-
nied, and the defendant excepted. During the taking of the defendant's
evidence, the plaintiff dismissed as to the resident foreman. It was
held that the petition for removal had been properly denied.
The time when a cause of action such as the one in the principal case
becomes removable is a question which the courts have fairly definitely
settled, but one which is still likely to trip up the unwary lawyer.2 It
is the purpose of this note to state the rules which the courts have
formulated.
1295 S. W. 492 (Mo. App.).
2 Of course, in many cases in which it appears that the lawyers had been
caught asleep it is possible that they had had no serious desire to remove the
cause; that the point had originally been raised solely for the purpose of delay;
and that they paid no more than slight attention to it until after the case had
been lost in the trial court.
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